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It is commonly argued that in recent years pharmaceutical companies have directed their
R&D towards small improvements of existing compounds instead of more risky drastic inno-
vations. In this paper we show that the proliferation of these small innovations is likely to be
linked to the lack of market sensitivity of a part of the demand to changes in prices. Compared
to their social contribution, small innovations are relatively more proﬁtable than large ones
because they are targeted to the smaller but more inelastic part of the demand. We also study
the eﬀect of regulatory instruments such as price ceilings, copayments and reference prices and
extend the analysis to competition in research.
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1 Introduction
The pharmaceutical industry channels an important proportion of total research in most
developed countries. In Europe, for example, it represents around the 13% of total R&D. In
recent years pharmaceutical companies have been accused of devoting their resources mainly
to minor improvements over existing medications that require short clinical trials and have a
small risk of not being approved. In a survey for the U.S. by the National Institute for Health
Care Management (NIHCM (2002)) it is reported that only 17% of all the drugs approved
by the FDA in the period 1989-2000 can be classiﬁed as drastic innovations, while 51% were
mere modiﬁcations of existing compounds.1 At the same time, it has been documented that
pharmaceutical companies have increased substantially their investment in advertising and
marketing of their products. According to some estimates, advertising expenditures in the U.S.
multiplied by a factor of three between 1998 and 2004.2
In this paper, we show that the recent trend in the pharmaceutical industry towards small
innovations is related to the low sensitivity of the demand. We show that the rewards that
innovators obtain are distorted in a systematic way with respect to the social contribution they
provide. In particular, small innovations get a proportionally larger reward because pharma-
ceutical ﬁrms target them to the inelastic part of the doctor’s induced demand. This lack
of elasticity is due to the subsidy by public health agencies and HMOs of the cost of these
medications. As a consequence, ﬁrms ﬁnd relatively more proﬁtable to invest in small innova-
tions. Advertising contributes to this strategy by attracting inelastic buyers that are otherwise
insensitive to price changes.
Small innovations are particularly visible in two contexts. They might be the response to the
entry of generic products or the result of competition with products patented by competitors.
In the ﬁrst case, many countries grant an extension of the monopoly power of ﬁrms that
provide improvements (albeit minor) of their products, for which a new product patent would
not be granted. In the U.S., for example, the Hatch-Waxman Act (1984) grants an extension
1See Lexchin (2003) and Love (2003) for additional evidence on the bias toward small innovations.
2See The Economist, March 17th 2005.A World of Small Innovations 2
of three years for ”incrementally modiﬁed drugs” (IMD) and ﬁve years for ”new molecular
entities” (NME).3 Moreover, in some countries modiﬁcations of existing compounds are entitled
to process patents that extend the innovator’s protection after the expiration of the original
patent.
In the second case, pharmaceutical ﬁrms often engage in the modiﬁcation of successful prod-
ucts marketed by competitors in expanding markets as a way to steal proﬁts. These are often
denoted me-too drugs. The market for statins is a case in point. Statins are cholesterol-lowering
drugs that appeared in the 1990s. Starting from Lovastatin, several ﬁrms have introduced com-
peting varieties of the compound like simvastatin (Zocor), atorvastatin (Lipitor), pravastatin
(pravachol), ﬂuvastatin (Lescol) or rosuvastatin (Crestor). These products are claimed to be
close substitutes, and arguably they involve a lower risk and lower investment than the devel-
opment of more innovative products.4
We aim to understand why ﬁrms in this market tend to target their research to these small
improvements. Starting with Nordhaus (1969), existing literature on innovation has commonly
argued that to the extent that ﬁrms do not internalize all the surplus of the innovations they
generate, underinvestment is likely to arise. The existence of patents is seen as a way to address
this ineﬃciency and classical papers such as Gilbert and Shapiro (1990) and Klemperer (1990)
have studied the trade-oﬀs of longer versus wider patents. Recent papers, such as Scotchmer
(1999), have shown that patents are also eﬃcient tools to relate the value of the invention to
the social reward it generates. In this paper, we argue that in obtaining the optimal level
of innovation an additional margin is important. As the previous examples illustrate, ﬁrms
typically choose the size of the innovation they pursue, and for this reason, underinvestment
(or overinvestment) will be a function of how close is the contribution for each size of innovation
they might achieve to the social welfare they generate. Misallocation of resources will occur
in markets where the signals originating from the demand for the good are dampened in a
systematic way.
3See Bulow (2004) for a review of the Hatch-Waxman Act, and the eﬀects on patentholders and potential
generic producers.
4See Hollis (2005) for a more in-depth discussion of these issues.A World of Small Innovations 3
The results we obtain are related to the particular structure of the demand for pharma-
ceutical products, compared to other markets where innovation is important. Patients often
do not pay nor they choose the medications they purchase, as they are prescribed by their
physicians. For this reason, how much the demand is price sensitive depends on how much
physicians internalize the real cost of the medication as opposed to internalizing the prefer-
ences of their patients. In the second case, they might align with their patients if for example
they are concerned with maximizing the success rate of a treatment at any cost or if they believe
that the prescription of a heavily advertised branded product instead of a generic one aﬀects
the patient’s perception of the treatment.5 Hellerstein (1998) ﬁnds indeed empirical evidence
of this diﬀerentiated behavior. As Scherer (1993) states
“it is not too extreme an oversimpliﬁcation to suppose that when generic substi-
tutes exist, the world of drug buyers consists of two quite diﬀerent groups – those
that are price-sensitive and those who are not. When there is only one branded
product, the pricing problem is straightforward. But once generic substitutes enter
at much lower prices, the market is bifurcated, and the incumbent branded seller
commonly ﬁnds it more proﬁtable to desert the price-sensitive market than to reduce
the prices quoted to price-sensitive customers.”
Along those lines, the model we construct includes two kinds of induced demand. Those
doctors that internalize the preferences of their patients are denoted as captured doctors. The
rest of the doctors, that take into account the beneﬁt as well as the cost of the several med-
ications, are denoted as non-captured doctors.6 Pharmaceutical ﬁrms might choose between
setting a high price in order to sell to the captured part of the demand or to charge a rather
lower price in order to also attract the rest of the patients. For ﬁrms with small innovations,
5Other alternative explanations for the low demand elasticity are related to the lack of incentives of doc-
tors to be informed about the quality of products and their price. See for example Caves et al. (1991) and
Danzon and Chao (2000).
6Along similar lines Frank and Salkever (1992) propose a model where the demand for a patented product
is divided into two segments depending on whether they are sensitive to the price of the generic product or not.
However, they are not concerned with the incentives for further research to be undertaken.A World of Small Innovations 4
a higher price compensates for the lower level of sales, while for big improvements, serving the
whole market is optimal, since the willingness to pay of price-sensitive consumers is higher.
Compared to the social optimum, the lack of price-sensitivity of the demand provides an
excessive reward for small innovations and consequently it distorts the incentives of pharma-
ceutical ﬁrms. As a result, ﬁrms underinvest in R&D. As mentioned earlier, this result does
not arise from the lack of rents from innovation but rather on how these rents are distributed
across diﬀerent possible improvements.
To address the excessive market power of pharmaceutical ﬁrms and reduce the medical
expenditures, additional regulations are in place in most countries. Although they were not
intended to modify the incentives of ﬁrms to innovate they have clear eﬀects. As an example,
we study the likely eﬀects on the resulting innovation of three commonly used instruments:
price ceilings, copayments and reference prices.7
Pharmaceutical ﬁrms often argue that this kind of price controls, to the extent that they
reduce the proﬁts from innovation, lead to a lower level of research. The lesson from our study
is that although these instruments might help reduce excessive rents derived from the distorted
demand, they might also provide more incentives (sometimes even excessive) to undertake
research. The result depends on how each instrument aﬀects the resulting demand elasticity.
In this respect, there is a clear trade-oﬀ between the kind of insurance that creates the distorted
demand in the ﬁrst place and the possibility to align the incentives of innovators and society.
Price ceilings, for example, still insure perfectly the patient’s expenses, while at the same
time they limit the monopoly power of the pharmaceutical ﬁrm. Trivially, if the insurer had
perfect information regarding the social contribution of the improvement, a price ceiling con-
tingent on the characteristics of the innovation would implement the ﬁrst best. To the extent
that this is not possible, and this is one of the reasons why patents exist, a price ceiling does
not help to make the demand more elastic to changes in the price. As a result, large innovations
might receive smaller than optimal rewards and induce even lower investment.
7Although we analyze them separately, in practice they often co-exist. For example, in Germany, patients
typically pay 10 % of the price with a minimum of 5 euros and a maximum of 10 euros. They also cover the
excess price diﬀerence using reference pricing.A World of Small Innovations 5
Copayments and reference prices aﬀect directly the payment that patients make of their
prescriptions. Consequently, they reduce the insurance provided but lead to a more elastic
demand. However, because copayments subsidize a percentage of the cost of the prescription
while reference prices subsidize a constant amount the results are diﬀerent. Reference prices
only induce the ﬁrst best when no insurance exists, while this outcome can be achieved with a
more modest copayment.
The last section of the paper generalizes the model to the case of competition in innovation
among pharmaceutical ﬁrms. We devise an environment in which under competition the ﬁrst
best can be achieved if the demand is perfectly sensitive to the price. Captured doctors have in
this case an ambiguous eﬀect on the level of innovation due to two opposing forces. On the one
hand, a less sensitive demand provides more incentives to each ﬁrm to reach an improvement
that supercedes the innovation that the rival achieves. On the other, contingent on superseding
the rival, the demand becomes very little sensitive to further improvements. We show by means
of example that the second force is likely to dominate when the risk of the R&D process is large,
leading to underinvestment.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section introduces the benchmark model. Section
3 discusses the eﬀects of each of the instruments and section 4 analyzes the scenario with
competition. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
Consider a market where a number of ﬁrms is producing an existing good. We normalize its
quality to 0. One of the ﬁrms, ﬁrm i, can invest in increasing its quality by performing R&D.
Firm i makes eﬀort θ to obtain a good of random quality v in the interval [0,1]. The quality
of the good originates from the distribution F(v,θ) with density f(v,θ). We assume that the
distribution F is ordered in the ﬁrst-order stochastic sense, so that more eﬀort increases the
probability of obtaining a good of high quality; if θ
0 > θ then F(v,θ
0) < F(v,θ) for all v. TheA World of Small Innovations 6
cost of performing eﬀort θ is also denoted as θ.8
We assume that the marginal cost of production of all goods is normalized to 0. As a result
of competition, the original good has an equilibrium price of 0, while ﬁrm i sets a positive price
p for its improved good.9
The demand side of the market corresponds to a unit mass of patients with a completely
inelastic demand for a single unit of the good. Each patient derives utility U(v) = v. We
initially assume that patients do not pay directly for the good, and the cost is incurred instead
by an insurance company. We further assume that regulation sets a price ceiling, which is
limited to 1.
The demand for the good is induced by the doctors that prescribe the medication. There
are two kinds of doctors. A proportion σ are denoted as captured doctors (C), that prescribe
the good with the highest quality regardless of its price. The remaining proportion 1−σ of non-
captured doctors (NC) assign the medication according to a cost-eﬃciency analysis. Captured
doctors’ preferences can be represented by a utility function
UC(v) = U(v) = v,
which can be interpreted as collusion between doctors and their patients. Non-captured doctors
take into account the valuation as well as the price of the good according to the utility function
UNC(v,p) = v − p
so that they choose as if patients themselves had to pay the price of the medication. In other
words, they consider the total cost and beneﬁt for the patient and the insurer.
The timing of the game is as follows. In the ﬁrst stage, ﬁrm i chooses eﬀort θ. In the second
stage the quality v is realized and market competition leads to equilibrium prices and allocation
of the goods.
8By redeﬁning the density function f, any cost function C(θ) would lead to the same results in as long as C
is increasing in θ.
9For this equilibrium to exist we only require that at least one ﬁrm other than ﬁrm i produces the original
good. This is consistent with the two kinds of examples discussed in the introduction. That is, the original
market could be served with generic products after the expiration of a patent, possibly of ﬁrm i. Alternatively,
the improvement of ﬁrm i does not infringe the patent owned by the creator of the existing product.A World of Small Innovations 7
2.1 The First Best
From the social point of view, the optimal allocation of the goods is simple. Given that the
marginal cost of production is 0 and all patients are alike, they ought to consume the good with
quality v. Hence, the social value that an innovation of size v generates is precisely S(v) = v,







To avoid trivial results, we focus on the case in which the socially optimal level of investment
is positive.
2.2 The Market Equilibrium
In the private solution, the price p that ﬁrm i sets in the second stage, and the ensuing
proﬁts, aﬀect the innovative eﬀort that the ﬁrm chooses. In spite of the assumption that
patients do not pay for the price of the good, the demand of ﬁrm i will depend on the price
because some doctors are price sensitive when prescribing the good. These doctors only choose
the good sold by ﬁrm i when it provides net value v − p larger than what the homogeneous
product would provide, 0.
Hence, for a given quality v, ﬁrm i might essentially maximize proﬁts by choosing two
diﬀerent prices depending on whether only the captured doctors prescribe the drug or all
doctors prescribe it. For the ﬁrst, the maximum price allowed, p = 1 is optimal, resulting in
sales of σ. For the second, the optimal price is deﬁned as p = v so that all doctors prescribe the
drug and sales are 1. By comparing the proﬁts from both options we can derive the following
lemma.
Lemma 1 For high quality improvements, v ≥ σ the optimal price is p = v so that ﬁrm i sells
to all patients. Otherwise, the optimal price is p = 1 and a proportion σ of patients buys the
improved product.A World of Small Innovations 8
Interestingly, while this model naturally predicts that larger innovations are associated with
higher proﬁts, they do not necessarily lead to a higher price for the good.
In the ﬁrst stage, the eﬀort decision of ﬁrm i depends on the proﬁts obtained from the sale
of the good. In particular, because proﬁts from a small and a large improvement correspond











Notice that for σ = 0 the private choice of eﬀort coincides with the ﬁrst best, since the innovator
captures all the surplus generated from the production of the good and θ
∗ = θ
S. However, for
larger values of σ distortions will in general arise. In particular, a higher proportion of captured
doctors implies that the proﬁts of ﬁrm i for a larger range of low realizations of v are higher than
the social value they generate. This is so, because the improvement generates a social value of
v, yet the ﬁrm obtains proﬁts σ > v. As Figure 1 shows, this distortion reduces the incentives to
exert innovative eﬀort because low realizations of v are to some extent insured by the inelastic
preferences of captured doctors. We summarize these result in the next proposition.
Proposition 1 The private optimal choice of eﬀort is lower than the ﬁrst best for all σ > 0.
Moreover, the level of eﬀort θ
∗(σ) is decreasing in σ.
Notice that, contrary to other models of innovation, lower values of σ are associated with
lower expected proﬁts from innovation yet they provide more incentives to invest.
The underinvestment result is related to the low elasticity of the demand rather than the
particular construction we have used. In Appendix A we develop a model that delivers the
same results and assumes away the existence of a price ceiling and considers the dead-weight
loss from the market power that the pharmaceutical ﬁrm might exercise. As this extension
points out, underinvestment occurs as long as the proﬁt (which we denote as π(v)) from a

































Figure 1: As in the following ﬁgures, for diﬀerent realizations of v, the thin diagonal denotes
social value S while proﬁts corresponds to the thick line.
3 Impact of the Regulatory Instruments on R&D
In the previous section we have studied the R&D decision of ﬁrms under a distorted demand
resulting from the doctors’ decisions. Insurance companies and public health agencies react to
the resulting inelasticity of the demand by introducing complex regulatory instruments aimed
to align their own goals and the incentives of the doctors, towards the rationalization of the
expenditure on pharmaceutical products.
In this section we provide an overview of the likely eﬀects of the main regulatory instruments
over the incentives of ﬁrms to engage in R&D. To the extent that regulation is local but ﬁrms
innovate for a global market the analysis we present does not have normative content. It does
not intent to characterize the optimal policy but rather to outline the eﬀectiveness of these
instruments.
The three classical instruments we analyze are price ceilings, copayments and reference
prices. Although each instrument has diﬀerent consequences our analysis conveys the messageA World of Small Innovations 10
that regulations that increase the elasticity of the demand have in general a positive eﬀect on
innovation. Hence, contrary to what pharmaceutical ﬁrms often claim, regulations that reduce
their rents might still induce more research.
3.1 The Price Ceiling
In the benchmark case, we have normalized the maximum price that the ﬁrm can charge
(the price ceiling) to 1. Part of the distortions we have identiﬁed originate from the excessive
rents that this price ceiling provides to the ﬁrm. An obvious remark, therefore, is that if the
regulator has full information about the value of the innovation, a price ceiling of v trivially
implements the ﬁrst best. However, under imperfect information one may wonder whether
decreases in the price ceiling have positive eﬀects on the investment of ﬁrm i. As we now show
the results are in general ambiguous.
Given a price ceiling ˜ p, the characterization of the optimal price of ﬁrm i is similar to the
benchmark case. Only two prices might maximize proﬁts for the ﬁrm. If the ﬁrm targets only
captured doctors, it chooses a price ˜ p that yields proﬁts π = σ˜ p. When the ﬁrm targets all
patients, a price of v is chosen as long as v < ˜ p and p = ˜ p otherwise. Proﬁts correspond to
π = p. The next lemma summarizes these results.





˜ p if v ≥ ˜ p,
v if σ˜ p < v < ˜ p,
˜ p if v ≤ σ˜ p.
Figure 2 shows that the price ceiling does not only apply to small innovations but also has
eﬀects on large innovations, the price of which is bounded by ˜ p. This additional distortion
has important eﬀects on the choice of investment of ﬁrm i, θ
∗
PC. In particular, the optimal



















































Figure 2: Proﬁts given a reference price ˜ p.
As opposed to the other instruments we consider next, the eﬀect of a reduction in the
price ceiling is in general ambiguous. A lower price ceiling reduces the excessive rents of the
ﬁrm when low realizations of v occur, enticing it to increase the investment level. But to the
extent that a lower price ceiling also reduces the reward when a large innovation is achieved, an
opposing force arises. Hence, the direction of the results in general depends on the functional
assumptions on the distribution of innovations F.
An important implication of the previous remarks is that the ﬁrst best cannot be in general
achieved. A crucial diﬀerence between this instrument and copayments or reference prices
is that with a price ceiling the patient is still completely subsidized. The other mechanisms
operate, instead, by changing the demand elasticity. Given that the reward of the ﬁrm can only
be aligned with its social contribution through the price sensitiveness of the demand, under full
subsidization eﬃciency is not attainable.A World of Small Innovations 12
3.2 Copayments
By a copayment we mean a regulatory instrument for which patients pay a ﬁxed percentage
α < 1 of the cost of their prescriptions. The remaining part of the payment, as before, is
assumed to be paid by the insurer. Thus, patient preferences are now price-sensitive and can
be described according to
U(v,α,p) = v − αp.
In the same spirit as we have modelled doctors’ preferences in the previous section, we still
assume that non-captured doctors, concerned about the cost-eﬃciency of each medication,
do not change their utility function in this case (or in the case of reference prices). Cap-
tured doctors, concerned only about the utility of their patients, have their same preferences
UC(v,α,p) = U(v,α,p).
The equilibrium prices have features similar to the prices studied in the previous section.
Firm i can focus on either the proportion σ of captured doctors that are now price-sensitive and
are willing to pay a maximum price of min{ v
α,1} or cover the whole market and let the elastic
part of the demand function determine the price. In this last case, the price cannot exceed the
value of the improvement, v, that the product generates. Hence, ﬁrm i targets the inelastic
segment of the demand, whenever σ min{ v
α,1} is larger than v, or in other words, when the
ratio between the proportion of captured doctors and the copayment is large enough. The next
lemma characterizes the prices and proﬁts for ﬁrm i.





v if v ≥ σ,
1 if α < v < σ,
v
α if v ≤ α.
(ii) If α > σ then p = v.
Proﬁts are π = v when p = v and the whole market is covered, and π = σp otherwise.
We now turn to the R&D decision of ﬁrm i. Denote as θ
∗
CO(σ,α) the investment of the ﬁrm





























































Figure 3: Proﬁts with two levels of copayment α0 < α < σ.
price equates the value of the innovation, the incentives of the ﬁrm are correctly aligned with






















As Figure 3 illustrates, for low values of v the private proﬁts from the innovation still exceed the
social value they generate. However, because patients internalize part of the cost, a positive
α means a more elastic demand and a reduction of the rents from small innovations. This
intuition gives rise to the following proposition





One of the contributions of this paper is to highlight that, contrary to common wisdom, more
rents are not necessarily associated with higher incentives to innovate. In this case, introducingA World of Small Innovations 14
a copayment provides more incentives to invest in order to create large improvements, despite
the smaller rents that the ﬁrm can appropriate.
The previous result does not imply that a higher copayment generates more incentives to
invest in R&D. In fact, the comparative statics are in general ambiguous. To see it, consider
an increase in the copayment from α0 to α as depicted in Figure 3. Such an increase has
two diﬀerentiated eﬀects. It decreases the marginal return to innovations with v < α0 but it
increases the marginal return of innovations with quality between α0 and α. If a realization
of v in the ﬁrst range is relatively more likely than in the second, a higher copayment might
reduce the incentives to invest.
3.3 Reference Prices
A reference price is another instrument to regulate pharmaceutical expenditures. It corre-
sponds to a maximum price that the insurer refunds the patient for the prescription. If the
price exceeds this reference price, the diﬀerence between the actual price and the reference price
is borne by the patient. Let ¯ p be the reference price. Given a price p, the utility of the patient
can be written as
U(v,p, ¯ p) =
½
v if p ≤ ¯ p,
v − (p − ¯ p) if p > ¯ p.
Similarly to the previous cases, preferences of non-captured doctors are unchanged, while cap-
tured doctors adopt again the preferences of their patients.
As explained earlier, ﬁrm i needs to choose whether to only sell to the captured part of the
demand or to all patients. In the ﬁrst situation, the price is set according to the minimum of
the price ceiling 1 and the maximum willingness to pay of the patients (of captured doctors),
v + ¯ p. In order to sell to all patients, ﬁrm i optimally sets p = v. Proﬁts in the ﬁrst case
are σ min{v + ¯ p,1} while in the second, proﬁts are equal to v. Hence, larger σ and ¯ p make
the equilibrium where the ﬁrm serves only a part of the market more likely. The next lemma




































































Figure 4: Proﬁts with a reference price when (i) ¯ p ≥ 1 − σ and (ii) ¯ p < 1 − σ.





v if v ≥ σ,
1 if 1 − ¯ p ≤ v < σ,
v + ¯ p v < 1 − ¯ p.
(ii) If ¯ p < 1 − σ the price is
p =
½
v if v ≥
σ¯ p
1−σ,
v + ¯ p if v <
σ¯ p
1−σ.
Proﬁts are π = v when p = v and the whole market is covered, and otherwise π = σp.
Regarding the R&D decision of ﬁrm i, we denote θ
∗
RP(σ, ¯ p) the level of investment. Figure
4(i) and 4(ii) illustrate the proﬁts of the ﬁrm for diﬀerent realizations of v in each of the two
scenarios mentioned in the lemma. For case (i), the optimal investment of the ﬁrm corresponds
to the solution to
θ
∗










vf(v,θ)dv − θ. (2)
In case (ii) the optimal investment is obtained as
θ
∗









vf(v,θ)dv − θ. (3)A World of Small Innovations 16
From Lemma 4, a higher reference price leads to higher optimal prices (and proﬁts) for low
realizations of v, since ¯ p is only relevant for the captured doctors. In fact, the comparison of
both cases shows that in case (i) proﬁts for ﬁrm i are larger for low realizations of v. These
excessive returns for low values of v reduce more the incentives to invest in case (i) in comparison
with case (ii). Furthermore, this intuition can be generalized to any value of the reference price,





RP(σ, ¯ p) ≤ θ
S is decreasing in ¯ p.
As expected, when ¯ p goes to 0, equation (3) converges to the planner’s problem and the
ﬁrst best is thus achieved. Similarly, when ¯ p converges to 1, equation (2) converges to the
benchmark monopoly case.
We have therefore shown that the reference price is an eﬀective tool to align the incentives
of the ﬁrm and the society. However, because the optimal investment level is only achieved
when ¯ p = 0, no ineﬃciency is linked to the lack of insurance to patients. This extreme result is
opposed to the characterization of the copayment scheme, for which eﬃciency can be obtained
even with a modest level of subsidization 1 −α. These two diﬀerent results arise from the way
each mechanism aﬀects the demand elasticity of the captured doctors. While in the case of
the reference price, decreases in ¯ p represent a constant shift in the price of the ﬁrm for low
realizations of v, increases in the copayment decrease the slope of the proﬁt proﬁle.
4 Competition
We now turn to the study of the eﬀects of the captured doctors in the context of competition.
As we have shown, in the case of a single monopolist, the existence of captured doctors decreases
the demand elasticity, specially for small innovations, and results in a reduction in the innovative
eﬀort of the ﬁrm. Under oligopoly, we will show that the result is in general unclear, since ﬁrms
will also try to be the one with the leading improvement. It is also important to emphasize that
in the environment we consider, the typical distortions associated to patent races characterizedA World of Small Innovations 17
for example in Loury (1979) do not arise and, absent the captured doctors, the ﬁrst best would
be achieved with the decentralized choice of ﬁrms’ eﬀort.
In particular, suppose that starting from the situation where a good of quality 0 is produced
competitively, two ﬁrms i = 1,2 can obtain an improvement. Both ﬁrms share the same
technology, which implies that the quality of their improvements originates from the same
distribution f(v,θ), and incur the same cost of investment θ.
The ﬁrst best is easy to characterize. Given that all patients are identical and that the
marginal cost of production is identical for all goods, if ﬁrm 1 and 2 obtain an improvement v1
and v2 respectively, the social optimum implies that only the good with the highest quality is













f(v2,θ2)dv2 − θ1 − θ2 (4)






In the competitive solution, absent the captured doctors, if ﬁrm 1 and 2 charge prices p1
and p2 respectively, doctors prefer good 1 to good 2 only if
v1 − p1 ≥ v2 − p2.
Again, since all ﬁrms have a marginal cost of production of 0, standard arguments related to
Bertrand competition lead to the outcome that if, for example, v1 > v2, then p1 = v1 − v2 and
p2 = 0. Proﬁts would result in π1 = v1 − v2 and π2 = 0.
In the ﬁrst stage, ﬁrm 1 and 2 choose the investment simultaneously. Firm 1, given θ2,









f(v2,θ2)dv2 − θ1, (5)





The next lemma, shows that the investment chosen privately by ﬁrms coincide with the ﬁrst
best.
10Notice that by focussing on the symmetric solution we exclude scale economies in research that would lead
to only one ﬁrm investing.A World of Small Innovations 18






As this lemma shows, competition between both ﬁrms does not generate any ineﬃciency
in this environment. This result is due to the fact that each ﬁrm appropriates only of the
surplus it generates. In other words, each ﬁrm implicitly internalizes in its research eﬀort the
negative marginal eﬀect it has on the proﬁts accrued by the competitor. Figure 5(i) makes this
argument clear by comparing the social contribution of a ﬁrm with its private proﬁts. This is
the reason why, compared to the usual case of patent races where the winner-takes-all prevails,
we do not obtain overinvestment. This feature of the equilibrium turns out to be convenient in
order to study the eﬀect of the captured doctors.
This equivalence result does in general not hold for a general value of σ. To see it, consider
the opposite case, characterized by σ = 1. There, in the competitive solution it would still
be the case that the ﬁrm with the highest quality sells the good, prescribed by the captured
doctors. The price is limited by the regulated ceiling, pi = 1. The other ﬁrm does not sell.











(1 − F(v2,θ1))f(v2,θ2)dv2 − θ1 (6)
The comparison with the ﬁrst best case (and the situation with σ = 0) is in general unclear.
As Figure 5(ii) illustrates, with a larger σ each ﬁrm has more incentives to reach an innovation
larger than the competitor. However, provided that a ﬁrm achieves an innovation larger than the
competitor, the marginal return from a larger improvement is lower than its social contribution.
To illustrate these two forces we now discuss a simple example.
4.1 An Example
Let’s assume that f(v,θ) is such that there are two possible realizations of v, v and ¯ v. We
parameterize these realizations as v = 1
2 − x and ¯ v = 1
2 + x, where 0 ≤ x ≤ 1
2 is a measure of
the risk of the innovative process. Given an investment level θi, the probability of obtaining
the high realization is θ
1
2































Figure 5: Proﬁts of ﬁrm 1 and social welfare generated as a function of v1 for a given value of
v2 when (i) σ = 0 and when (ii) σ = 1.



























2)v − θ1 − θ2.
Hence, only when both ﬁrms obtain a low realization of v, the good with value v is consumed.








¯ v − v

















2)(¯ v − v) − θ1.
As stated in Lemma 5, the Nash Equilibrium of the game also implements the ﬁrst best.
However, when σ = 1, the payoﬀs of each of the ﬁrms are as follows. When both ﬁrms
obtain the same improvement, both charge a price equal to 1 and share proﬁts equally, so that
each obtains 1
2.11 When a ﬁrm obtains an improvement ¯ v and the competitor v proﬁts are 1.
11Given that doctors are not sensitive to price reductions, other equilibria can arise. However, for the purposes
of this example other symmetric equilibria have identical implications.A World of Small Innovations 20


































Comparing the market equilibrium with the ﬁrst best we observe that when x < 1
3 the
competitive equilibrium yields excessive innovation while the opposite is true for x > 1
3. As
discussed above, the intuition for the result is the following. When x is very small, the produc-
tivity of eﬀort is small. However, the proﬁts from obtaining the high innovation are above the
social welfare generated, leading to overinvestment. An opposing force arises from the lack of
sensitivity of proﬁts to increases in the value of the high realization. For this reason, when x is
large the ﬁrst best would require more investment, yet the equilibrium investment is unchanged
because the private return from innovation is independent of x.
5 Concluding Remarks
This paper presents a stylized model of innovation that emphasizes the distortions induced
on innovation by the diﬀerent layers of incentives in the relationship between patients and
pharmaceutical ﬁrms. We have exempliﬁed these distortions in the diﬀerentiated behavior of
some doctors, depending on whether they perform an eﬃcient cost-beneﬁt analysis of each
product or if instead they internalize the preferences of their patients. Although this is a rough
description of the doctors’ conduct, it is consistent with empirical evidence obtained using
prescription data.
A more structural model should explicitly consider the behavior of doctors and in particular,
how they are aﬀected by the level of advertising of pharmaceutical companies. As it has been
documented, doctors are not necessarily aware of all products available, their prices and qualities
and they might be subject to manipulation by these ﬁrms. Competition between pharmaceutical
companies to capture doctors as opposed to competition to obtain better products might be
an interesting avenue for further research.A World of Small Innovations 21
Nevertheless, the results of the paper essentially rely on the lower than eﬃcient price elas-
ticity of some doctors. Regardless of whether this low elasticity originates from the doctor
capture by patients or pharmaceutical ﬁrms, or it is just due to the lack of information of these
doctors, the general message of this paper remain unchanged. The level of research that ﬁrms
undertake depends not only on the total rents from innovation, but also – once we take into
account that the level of innovation is endogenous – on the rewards that the ﬁrm obtains for
any size of innovation it might achieve. In this sector, low price elasticity entails a bias towards
small innovations.
Finally, this paper has policy implications for the debate on the eﬀects of regulation of
pharmaceutical expenditure. Pharmaceutical companies often claim that instruments aimed
to reduce the agency problem between doctors and insurers might reduce the incentives to
innovate. Our results suggest that these instruments might indeed reduce the reward from
some innovations, the social value of which is small, yet they induce higher incentives to obtain
larger innovations.A World of Small Innovations 22
A Heterogeneity in the Doctors’ Capture
We now extend the benchmark model to allow for heterogeneity in the degree of doctor’s
capture. As we will see, this heterogeneity allows us to dispense with the assumption that
the price is constrained to be below 1, yet the results will remain essentially unchanged.12 We
still assume that the proportion 1 − σ of non-captured doctors that perform the cost-beneﬁt
analysis is homogeneous. However, captured doctors are heterogeneous in a parameter s that
is distributed uniformly between 0 and 1, and their utility corresponds to
UC(v) = v + s − p.
Hence, doctors do not share the same preferences than their patients, and instead they overesti-
mate the eﬀect that the new product has on them. This additional value s can be rationalized,
for example, as the increase in the quality perception derived from advertising. The resulting





1 if p ≤ v
σ(v + 1 − p) if v < p ≤ 1 + v,
0 otherwise
As before, ﬁrm i might choose between selling to all consumers or only to the non-sensitive
part of the demand. While for the earlier, the optimal price still corresponds to p = v, for the
latter, the optimal price maximizes
max
p
σ(1 + v − p)p
which results in p∗ = 1+v
2 . Compared to the benchmark model, the relevant price and the
quantity sold when ﬁrm i targets the inelastic part of the demand are strictly increasing in v.
Comparing proﬁts in both cases, we obtain the following result.




v if v ≥ v∗(σ),
1+v
2 otherwise,
12Since the need for this price limit is due to the fact that captured doctors induce a completely inelastic
demand, we could alternatively assume that doctors have a positive yet lower than optimal price elasticity.A World of Small Innovations 23







− 1 is increasing in σ. Proﬁts can be written as
π(v) =
½






with π0(v) < 1 when v < v∗(σ).
Notice that similarly to the benchmark model, for low values of v, proﬁts for ﬁrm i are
higher than the surplus generated. Moreover, proﬁts in this range rise with increases in v less
than the social welfare generated. The next proposition shows that in any such case the ﬁrm
will invest less than what is socially optimal.
Proposition 4 For any π(v) increasing in v such that π0(v) ≤ 1, θ
∗ ≤ θ
S, with strict inequality
if there exists a range of v for which π0(v) < 1 and f(v,θ) > 0 for all θ.
This proposition also allows us to contribute to the classical debate on how to provide
incentives to innovate. Most papers have mainly focused on the trade-oﬀ between assigning
monopoly power to innovators in order to internalize the returns from their research and the
minimization of the resulting dead-weight loss. While often the size of the innovation that
ﬁrms achieve is assumed to be exogenous, here it is the object of our study. As a result, we
show that although ﬁrms might receive a reward from their innovation higher than their social
contribution, underinvestment might occur if the increase in this reward when higher eﬀort in
research is exerted is lower than socially optimal.
Finally, notice that we have undertaken this analysis in a context where no dead-weight loss
from monopoly power arises in order to emphasize our results. However, the possibility of this
dead-weight loss is not likely to change the results, since it would correspond to an additional
force reducing the incentives to innovate.A World of Small Innovations 24
B Proofs
B.1 Preliminary Result and Notation
We will make repeated use of the following very well-known result, which we state as a
lemma: if X ≥st Y then for all increasing functions ψ, E[ψ(X)] ≥ E[ψ(Y )].
Lemma 7 Let X and Y be real-valued random variables with cumulative distribution functions
F and G respectively, such that F(z) ≤ G(z) for all z ∈ R. For all bounded real-valued







B.2 Proofs of the Results
Proof of Lemma 1: Immediate from the arguments in the main text.
















and from our assumptions on F,
∂π(σ,θ)
∂σ is decreasing in θ, which concludes the proof.
Proof of Lemma 2: Immediate from the arguments in the main text.
Proof of Lemma 3: Immediate from the arguments in the main text.
Proof of Proposition 2: Part (ii) is immediate from the fact that when α > σ the problem
of the ﬁrm coincides with the social planner’s problem.
For part (i) notice that








f(v,θ)dvA World of Small Innovations 25
and using Lemma 7, π(σ,α,θ) − π(σ,0,θ) is increasing in θ given that
H(v) =
½
0 if v ≥ α,
σ[ v
α − 1] if v < α.
is weakly increasing in v. The results of Milgron and Shannon (1994) and the fact that





Proof of lemma 4: Immediate from the arguments in the main text.
Proof of Proposition 3: Two cases need to be analyzed. When (i) ¯ p0 > ¯ p ≥ 1 − σ, then








σ (v + ¯ p − 1)f(v,θ)dv (7)





0 v > 1 − ¯ p,
σ (v + ¯ p − 1) if 1 − ¯ p0 ≤ v < 1 − ¯ p,
σ (¯ p − ¯ p) if v < 1 − ¯ p0,
is weakly increasing in v.
Similarly, if ¯ p0 < ¯ p < 1 − σ.











(v − σ (v + ¯ p
0))f(v,θ)dv (8)









v − σ (v + ¯ p0) if
σ¯ p
1−σ ≤ v <
σ¯ p0
1−σ,
σ (¯ p − ¯ p0) if v <
σ¯ p
1−σ.
is weakly increasing. The results of Milgron and Shannon (1994) and the fact that π(σ, ¯ p,θ)−
π(σ, ¯ p0,θ) is increasing in θ imply that θ
∗




S since when ¯ p = 1 the ﬁrm’s and social planner’s problem coincide, we can conclude that
θ
∗
RP(σ, ¯ p) ≤ θ
S for all ¯ p.












f(v2,θ2)dv2 − θ1 − θ2 (9)A World of Small Innovations 26
By adding and subtracting
R 1











f(v2,θ2)dv2 − θ1 − θ2 (10)









f(v2,θ2)dv2 − θ1. (11)
We realize that the ﬁrst order conditions over θ1 must coincide in both problems for a given
θ2. We can do the same with respect to θ2, obtaining the same conclusion. This concludes the
proof.
Proof of Lemma 6: Immediate from the arguments in the text.
Proof of Proposition 4:












(γπ(v) + (1 − γ)v)f(v,θ)dv − θ,




Notice that θ(γ) is decreasing in γ if H(θ,γ) has decreasing diﬀerences in θ and γ. Taking the



















which is negative if π0(v) < 1.A World of Small Innovations 27
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